Is the U.S. prepared for another terrorist attack? Essay

In the event of the terrorist charges of 9/11, securing the country has become a national priority. The events of 9/11 were the first good beats on the United States (U.S.) since Pearl Harbor which catapulted the U.S. into World War II. As of the indite of this paper, the U.S. has been engaged in the War on solicitudeism for 13 years. During this period of time the U.S. has been kept unaffectionate from terrorist eruptions by changes to righteousnesss, technology, and investigative modes to combat terrorist act internationally. Although there crap been a number of changes to U.S. law and American citizens bugger off been kept safe, the threat of terrorism has not abated. With the continued threat of terrorism to the U.S. and its citizens, there is a high probability that the U.S. will suffer other 9/11 type of event. The U.S. has shown its resolve in reanimateing from 9/11 and the many natural disasters that have deceasered since and is preparing for incidents in the future. There is a superfluity of information and studies conducted after 9/11 that, in great accompaniment, informed us to the extent we failed to hinder the events of 9/11. Ironically, in the years after the creation of the Department of country of origin Security (DHS) many academics scent we argon no safer flat than we were prior to 9/11. In a diachronical context, the U.S. has been reactive in nature to every major catastrophe it has endured.The cycle of disaster events has repeated itself over and over passim our history. The U.S. experiences a major solution event, fails in the initial repartee and recovery efforts, endures congressional investigations, obtains funding to check the failures, execute the recovery effort, and return to a complacency mentality until another(prenominal) major event occurs. The adjudicate of this paper is to address the question of the U.S. readiness in the event there is another terrorist attack. I end to decoct on the aspect of gr ooming, reforms, and interagency coordination out front and after the next terrorist attack. This paper will argue that the preparation for a terrorist attack is required its not a question of how an attack is orchestrated. The question is the U.S. vigilant for another terrorist attack and recovery? Literature ReviewIn Perrys (2001) analysis he explains the actions that the U.S. take to take in preparation for the next attack. The articles in the public eye(predicate)ation is under the premise of a worst causa scenario as it pertained to terrorism in 2001. The primary focus of the article was the U.S. preparation for any delivery method terrorist placements could result. There was a disquiet that terrorist organizations could/would buy nu eliminate weapon platforms from rogue Soviet BLOC nations. The barely instruction these attacks could be defeated was by the mix of three strategies dissuaderence, prevention, and defense. The ability for the U.S. to use conventional f orces to deter enemies needed to be maintained as well as the watchword community with an aggressive parkway against nations that sponsor terrorism.In the article, The Next Attack, Flynn (2007) provides a framework in which terrorist organization detonates a bomb at an oil refinery, near Philadelphias Citizen Bank Park, that essences in the release of a chemical cloud comprised of chemicals utilise in the refinery process. The cloud kills thousands over a ten day period as a result of breathing the fumes. In the aftermath of 9/11 the U.S. government concluded there was no way they could protect every essential asset and chose to specifically defend life-sustaining infrastructure networks. It was believed that terrorists would only attack large targets that they could get the biggest return on investment.Flynn took a very exact view of the U.S. governments response to compiling a list of high value targets that needed protection, It wasnt rocket skill to figure that out, and i t took five years to complete.Flynn further explained a need for manufacturing industries to utilize safer production methods known inherently as safer technology. The technology has a higher cost, but Flynn does an impressive cost comparison that the change-over could cost comprehensive for around $250 million, which is what was being spent daily on the war in Iraq.In Interagency Coordination in chemical reaction to Terrorism Promising Practices and Barriers Identified in Four Countries (Strom and Eyerman 2007) is an article that examines our nations ability to prepare, oppose, and recover from terrorism hinging on multiagency coordination. The focal point of the article is the explanation of the problems that existed pre-9/11 and the progress law enforcement agencies and public health agencies have in coordination with each other across multiple jurisdictions and countries. The article explains in detail the coordination problems that occur when two or more agencies are involve d in the corresponding incident. There is a competition for see and control, funding, redundant system and processes across multiple agencies.Two primary problems that were noted were the inability for all agencies to achieve an interoperable dialogues system to aid in interagency cooperation. The second problem is barriers to communication ranging from coordination and cultural barriers and the lack of proactive information sharing among multiple agencies. The authors noted several changes that needed to occur in order to be successful. The primary focus chokeing on ceasing interagency competition for funding as this has created fraud, waste, and abuse across multiple U.S. agencies. The second focus was fostering a liaison model and incorporating public- mystic partnerships as individual companies have systematically been delegated the responsibility of protecting their own businesses. Methodology and Research StrategyThe books review has produced some excellent talking point s that may show the U.S. government is not watchful for another 9/11 terrorist attack. This paper will review the readiness of the U.S. in preparation for the next terrorist attack and the ability to respond to that attack. My research will be qualitative in method and analysis in an attempt to produce arespectable projection of the U.S. readiness for the next terrorist attack. After reviewing twelve critical articles or books the quest question is presented. Is the U.S. prepared for another 9/11 terrorist attack? FindingsIn the pre-9/11 article CatastrophicTerrorism Elements of a National Policy, Carter explained that the U.S. was not taking the threat of terrorism, as they had known in that generation, seriously (Carter, Deutch and Zelikow 1998). In the aftermath of the embassy attacks in Kenya and Tanzania which killed hundreds Carter did not feel that the U.S. government was committed to address terroristic threats nor was it suitably prepared for a catastrophic terrorist eve nt.Carter gave a prophetic warning that a catastrophic event was plausible in 1998. Terrorist networks were no longer hiding in the shadow as they did during the Cold War. The Preventive disproof strategy, at that time, was outdated. Terrorist networks were embracing change, embedding with organized crime syndicates, drug and human traffickers, and money laundering which created the basic infrastructure of a terrorist organization. During this same time frame we saw the effects of globalization in the Sub-Sahara Africa as it folded in on its self and created lawless safe havens for terrorist organizations to freely operate. Carter predicted a catastrophic terror event would be a watershed event in U.S. history that would change law, challenge personal liberties, and ultimately make terrorism the focus of our national defense strategy (6). Carter and his team were virtually ignored until 9/11.In the aftermath of 9/11 Zelikow sat on the 9/11 delegation. Many of the findings that the 9/11 Commission determined came from the 1998 article. Ultimately, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) creation was in response to the large number of listed intelligence and operational failures among U.S. governmental agencies. These failures were over classification of intelligence, lack of information sharing, interagency competition in investigations, and multiple agencies conducting the same redundant tasks to name few. During DHSs inception twenty- two federal agencies and 170,000 employees, which specialized in various disciplines ranging from lawenforcement to disaster mitigation, were pulled under the control of DHS in order to streamline information sharing and overall interagency cooperation.In the years that followed many studies and reports to congress on the DHS suggest that the organization needed to be reformed receivable to over-all mismanagement and lack of any institutional control over the multiple agencies. The primary reason for concern is the organizat ions layer of bureaucratic red tape and political appointees who lack the ability and structural knowledge are hampering the Secretary of Homeland Defenses ability to lead U.S. security efforts (Carafano and Heyman, DHS 2.0 Rethinking the Department of Homeland Security 2004).The DHS has a leviathan size mission as it pertains to keeping the U.S. safe from terrorist activity. In 2003 report, Major Management Challenges and Program Risks Department of Homeland Security, the Government Accounting Office (GAO) reported the DHS was a high hazard organization for three reasons. First, the organization is too large to manage efficiently. The DHS creation is in response to the events of 9/11 without having a command structure properly planned. Second, among the 22 agencies under the DHS umbrella, there was a large amount of discord, strife, and competition before the merger. The merger did not quell the conflict, it actually added to the competition for funding and resources. Third, these failures expose the U.S. to other possibilities in regards to terrorism (Governement Accounting Office 2003).The GAO further outlines what DHS needs to do to alleviate some of the existing challenges they face now and in the future. DHS moldiness effectively integrate discording agencies in order to foster an environment of partnerships and working environments. DHS essential adopt and use public and private partnership business methods, as most of the protection Flynn mentioned precedent has fallen on the private sector and the dependency of first responders. The private sector controls 85 % of the critical infrastructure in the nation. Indeed, unless a terrorists target is a military or other control government facility, the first responders will almost certainly be civilians (9/11 Commission 2004).Finally, the DHS infrastructure must incorporate the maximum use of its brightest and best individuals and must foster interagency cooperation among multiple organizations and count ries simultaneously (pg. 1).Since 9/11 the U.S. has not experienced another 9/11 terrorist event, one could assume the DHS and the U.S. War on Terror is having a significant impact on terrorist activity. In 2011, The Heritage Foundation reported 40 terrorist plots had been thwarted since 9/11imputable to the efforts of DHS employees and power granted under the PATRIOT Act (Carafano and Zuckerman, War on Terrorism 40 Terrorists Attacks Foiled Since 9/11 2011). Although the PATRIOT Act granted law enforcement agencies nationwide powers and abilities they did not have pre 9/11, the agency has stonewalled terror attacks on U.S. soil, and it is still failing at multiple levels.At this point, it would not be wise to assume the U.S. is 100 percent safe from terror attacks or more importantly the ability or readiness to respond to one. The DHS track record for responding to natural disasters in the U.S. is poor, at best. matchless example is the DHS response to Hurricane Katrina. By the t ime Hurricane Katrina had made landfall the DHS had not established the roles and responsibilities that the public and private sectors would act upon in the survival and recovery of New Orleans, even though the energy and shipping facilities had been considered, national critical infrastructure for which the U.S. government should take substantial responsibility in the event of a disaster (Military technology 2005). This is where Flynn related this wasnt rocket science it just was not completed in a well-timed(a) manner.There have been a number of theories for the dysfunction of the DHS as it pertains to disaster response. One primary hypothesis is DHS does not have its priorities straight. DHS creation in response to the attacks of 9/11, with its primary focus being on prevention of future attacks. DHS thought process can be seen as one sided as 75 percent of the 3.35 billion in Federal grants were designated for counter-terrorism activities (pg. 104). Additionally, DHS was cha rged with not fully notifying local and stateleaders about the magnitude of the event and many mass-causality centers were diverted to Iraq and Afghanistan leaving the homeland under sourced.Of the 22 agencies that fall under DHS the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) has borne the brunt of the fallout in responding to disaster events. Prior to 9/11 FEMA held a cabinet level position within the Presidential Cabinet and responded to incidents with competence, ability, and utilized lessons versed to prevent the same mistakes in the future. Under the authority of DHS, FEMA lost its cabinet level position, lost freelance funding, and FEMAs competency and performance decreased significantly.Further adding to the dysfunction within the DHS and FEMAs ability to respond to incidents are the political ramifications of power sharing between the Federal government and state agencies. In response to Hurricane Katrina, the Federal government to include the Department of Defense, the De partment of Justice, and the White House could not determine if utilizing busy Duty would violate the Posse Comitatus Act. The DHS and White House did not want to take Constitutional rights away(p) from the states. This delay furthered much needed advertance to the hardest hit areas of the Gulf Coast. WAL-MART had a quicker response time of getting much need supplies into New Orleans but was unable to do enter and provide assistance due to the bureaucratic boondoggle in Washington (Abouo-Bakr 2013).In 2007 and 2009, FEMA participated in a national-level effect aimed at assessing U.S. capacity to prevent, prepare for, respond to, and recover from a large-scale disaster (Busch 2012). In the following months after these training exercises it was reported FEMA did not effectively manage, track, or maintain and failed to complete less than 40 percent of tonic actions noted (pg. 18). FEMA also failed to provide a training outline to address the corrective actions to ensure the mistak es made and lessons learned could be used at future training events in preparation for real life responses to disasters.ConclusionThe U.S. has thwarted terrorist attacks on the U.S., on both foreign anddomestic fronts, since the historic events of 9/11. The additional powers granted to the DHS under the PATRIOT Act have aided law enforcement agencies and anti-terrorism activities in the War on Terrorism. The question is not how well the DHS prevents future attacks it is a question of when the next attack will happen and how will the U.S. respond.In order for the DHS to become successful the Secretary of Homeland Defense must coordinate organizational and logistical support across all 22 agencies. The monetary focus of the DHS must be distributed equally along the other agencies supporting the relief efforts in the event another terrorist event occurs on U.S. soil. The DHS must foster an environment that encourages employees to create Private Public Partnerships (PPP). These partners hips must have a clear and concise plan and all players involved must have a clear understanding of their roles and responsibilities as it pertains to information and resource sharing during a response to a terror event.The kind between the DHS and PPP must foster long-term projects and must initially come from within the DHS. FEMA should be removed the organizational tree of DHS and have its cabinet level position re-established and given the ability to take in directly with the President of the United States and all emergency response assets nationwide. FEMAs ability must be restored to pre-9/11 levels in order to meet all future natural disasters or terrorist attacks. The USG must network with the private sector and ensure the plans created do not hamper their bottom line and ensure the cost/risk ratio is sufficient to stock holders in the private sector.The DHS and FEMA have applied some of the lessons learned in past response efforts and Congress has turned some of them into law. The two most important laws will assist FEMA in emergency management. First, the head of FEMA must be an emergency management professional and have least(prenominal) five years executive experience. Second, during a disaster, the lines of communication between the President and FEMA are open without intermission from the DHS (King, et al. 2009).The changes to law were a small step for FEMA but now allow them to coordinate with all organizations along the National Incident Management System and the National Response Framework. Both of the programs describe how multiple players from the last level to the Director of FEMA how they should work together in response to an incident. Both of these programs are balance to react to an incident whether it is a terrorist event or a natural disaster, but they still have a long way to go.The DHS prevents attacks well but at times fails miserably in response efforts due to interagency shortfalls. Until there is a balance between the effort s carried out in the War on Terror and the response efforts after an event the U.S. will not be prepared for the next attack.References9/11 Commission. The 9/11 Comission Report. July 26, 2004. www.9-11commission.gov/report/911Report.pdf (accessed 12 29, 2013). Abouo-Bakr, C. Managing Disasters through Public-Private Partnerships. Washington, DC Georgetown University Press, 2013. Busch, Jason. FEMA Falters in Self-Improvement. News Network, November 2012 18. Carafano, James, and David Heyman. DHS 2.0 Rethinking the Department of Homeland Security. additional Report SR-02, Washington The Heritage Foundation, 2004. Carafano, James, and Jessica Zuckerman. War on Terrorism 40 Terrorists Attacks Foiled Since 9/11 . September 7, 2011. http//www.heritage.org/research/reports/2011/09/40-terror-plots-foiled-since-9-11-combating-complacency-in-the-long-war-on-terror (accessed 12 24, 2013). Carter, Ashton B,, hindquarters M. Deutch, and Philip D. Zelikow. Catasrophic Terrorism Elements of a National Policy. Visions of Governance for the Twenty-First Century, John F. Kennedy School of Government, 1998. Flynn, Stephen. The Next Attack. The Washington Monthly, March 2007 31-37. Governement Accounting Office. Major Management Challenges and Program Risks Department of Hoeland Security. serial Report, Washington United States General Accounting Office, 2003. King, Peter, et al. Keep FEMA within Homeland Security. January 14, 2009. http//search.ebscohost.com.ezproxy2.apus.edu/login.aspx?direct=true&db=bwh&a